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Ideas & Issues (LearnIng, TraInIng and educaTIon )
The Education for Seapower (E4S) study, former Secre-tary of the Navy Richard V. Spencer’s subsequent decision 
memo laying out a sweeping reform of 
naval education, the establishment of 
the Navy’s new Director of Warfighter 
Development office, and the Com-
mandant’s Planning Guidance (CPG) 
all emphasize the importance of think-
ing and education to enhancing our 
warfighting capabilities. Following on 
the heels of the 2018 National Defense 
Strategy’s diagnosis that professional 
military education (PME) has “stag-
nated,”2 these strategic documents and 
actions reflect a broad understanding 
that training and education must move 
beyond an industrial era paradigm in 
order to enhance the intellectual agility 
and preparedness of our warfighters. 
However, despite this level of under-
standing, organizational transformation 
is not going to be easy. It never is. The 
E4S strategy is already under increas-
ing scrutiny, and the Department of 
the Navy eliminated the expansion in 
funding for implementing the strategy 
from its Fiscal Year 2022 budget re-
quest.3 Some earlier landmark reports 
that influenced education in remarkable 
ways also faced pushback, delays, and 
misunderstandings along the way.4 Even 
the Knox-Pye-King Board report, which 
helped inspire E4S, was at first thought 
impractical, and opponents attempted 
to suppress it.5 In fact, it is sobering 
how closely Gen David H. Berger’s CPG 
reflects Gen Al Gray’s initial guidance 
concerning the development of a “Con-
cept for Education” over thirty years 
ago—suggesting that despite a lot of 
effort from a lot of people, we still have 
not nudged our training and education 
system far enough beyond the industrial 
era paradigm, or else at some point we 
lost our way. 6
 People and organizations usually do 
not embrace change easily, and various 
kinds of individual, organizational, and 
bureaucratic inertias run deep. Thus, 
even though Training & Education 
Command is making encouraging 
strides toward revamping various train-
ing and education curricula, any endur-
ing or lasting change is going to require 
careful attention over a long period of 
time as well as a firm understanding 
of the intellectual foundations and 
instructional designs needed to make 
this paradigmatic change possible.7 It 
is in this spirit that we write this article. 
In previous articles, we have tried to 
explain some of the themes and intel-
lectual emphases in E4S and the CPG, 
including leadership aspects useful 
in the post-industrial era (“Leader-
ship for Seapower,” MCG, Dec2019) 
and the learning foundations for such 
skills (“Learning for Seapower,” MCG, 
Nov2020). Here, we focus on explain-
ing some of the foundations and dimen-
sions of intellectual agility and highlight 
why training and education institutions 
must leverage active learning approaches 
to help build and shape the intellectual 
agility of our warfighters. The Joint 
Chiefs of Staff underscore the impor-
tance of agility and transforming leader 
development and PME: “Our country 
requires warfighting leaders and staff of-
ficers capable of waging war and leading 
in a dynamic, globally integrated envi-
ronment.”8 Our observations are guided 
by a steadfast belief in the maneuver 
philosophy, which embraces the criti-
cality of developing agile minds (and 
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institutions) and empowering our war- 
fighters to make decisions in situations 
marked by stress and ambiguity, as well 
as the understanding we can do so by 
learning some valuable lessons from our 
own history.
Educating for Agility and Lifelong 
Learning: A Few Ideas
 The shift from the industrial era to 
the post-industrial era has changed the 
types of problems typically encountered, 
the most effective ways to organize, and 
the types of skills useful for future lead-
ers. Some of the most important fea-
tures of the post-industrial era include 
dynamics, change, and temporality as 
well as the corresponding need to shift 
away from static approaches and instead 
place a greater emphasis on educating 
for thinking and judgment. This senti-
ment is rooted in Marine Corps history, 
notably during the maneuver warfare 
movement under the strategic leadership 
of Gen Gray, who stressed, “Above all 
else we try to orient our training upon 
the cultivation of attitude that the only 
thing certain on the battlefield will be 
the uncertain—the unexpected.” Lead-
ers, according to Gray, must be able 
to think, be empowered to seize and 
maintain the initiative, and “view un-
certainty as an advantage to be capital-
ized upon, rather than a disadvantage 
that inhibits their options.”10
 Cultivating intellectual agility to 
take advantage of uncertainty is an es-
pecially important topic for our train-
ing and education institutions, since 
it not only encompasses curricula and 
teaching materials but also how we or-
ganize and lead these institutions and 
the instructional approaches we employ. 
Identifying a few relevant foundations 
and dimensions relating to intellectual 
agility and preparedness is thus prudent 
before discussing their implications for 
training and education. 
 Broadening minds. Given today’s “in-
creasingly complex global security envi-
ronment,”11 developing leaders who can 
think through ambiguous and chang-
ing situations, anticipate and adapt to 
change, and proactively problem solve 
and innovate thus takes on added im-
portance.12 Leaders with agile, active, 
and broad minds can apply knowledge 
to new and unforeseen situations and 
transfer knowledge between seemingly 
disparate domains. This, however, ne-
cessitates a shift from teaching students 
what to think to how to think.
 Col Mike Wyly, for example, rewrote 
the entire curriculum at Amphibious 
Warfare School after being named Head 
of Tactics in 1979 in order to teach stu-
dents how to make decisions rather than 
methodical decision-making processes 
they would never use in real war. He 
notes the implication for teachers: “His 
mission ... is to teach students to think, 
to exercise judgment. It is not to teach 
a repertoire of attacks or formulistic 
procedures.” In fact, the objective of 
any course or block of instruction is 
“not about imparting knowledge. It is 
about teaching judgment. There are no 
rules or formulas.”13 Focusing on help-
ing leaders think abstractly and make 
connections across a range of problems 
is more conducive to developing judg-
ment than teaching a tool that is limited 
to a particular field or already identified 
problem.
 Beyond hammers and nails. The prev-
alence of dynamics, change, and tem-
porality demands integrative, pluralistic 
approaches not only concerning disci-
plines and domains of knowledge but 
also the methodologies we use. Training 
for specific tools and techniques might 
have proven adequate to meet the de-
mands of the industrial era. However, 
a shift from repetitive, well-structured 
problems to ambiguity, uncertainty, and 
ill-structured problems requires a cor-
responding increase in the imagination, 
innovativeness, and critical thinking 
abilities of our leaders. They must be 
able to frame, think through, under-
stand, and solve problems featuring an 
increasing number of interdependencies. 
 Technology maintains the allure of 
a “quick fix,” but it certainly is not a 
long-term solution, as particular tools 
can quickly become outdated and lead 
to a myopic view of (and solutions for) 
complex problems.14 Thinking, rather 
than tools or technology, remains the 
central premise of maneuver warfare. 
Gen Gray explains,
[M]aneuver warfare isn’t so much a 
function of how you are equipped as it 
is a function of how you think. We ... 
concentrate on making the maximum 
use of the tools that are at our disposal 
rather than waiting for wish-list tech-
nologies to solve our problems.15
Concerning training and education in 
particular, this means we need to be 
aware of the potential pitfalls of edu-
cators (implicitly or explicitly) provid-
ing their students increasingly stronger 
hammers to use on increasingly small 
nails that are no longer relevant in the 
post-industrial era. 
 Educating for lifelong learning vs. 
checking the box on a requirement. A ma-
jor goal of teaching problem solving and 
critical thinking should be preparing 
the student for lifelong learning by in-
culcating the skills of self-instruction.16 
This is important because, as FMFM 1 
reminds us, “every Marine has a basic 
responsibility to study the profession of 
arms on his own. ... This is particularly 
“The 21st Century de-
mands American of-
ficers be far better 
educated and more ca-
pable of directing and 
integrating the Nation’s 
military instrument.” 9
 —Joint Chiefs of Staff
A major goal of teaching problem solving and critical 
thinking should be preparing the student for lifelong 
learning by inculcating the skills of self-instruction.
 www.mca-marines.org/gazette WE43Marine Corps Gazette • July 2021
true among officers; after all, an of-
ficer’s principal weapon is his mind.”17 
Unfortunately, as the CPG observes, 
the current training and education 
paradigm is based on passive learning, 
rote memorization, and regurgitation, 
which the philosopher and educator 
Mortimer Adler identifies as the doctri-
nal approach.18 The doctrinal approach 
is based on teachers imparting as much 
truth as possible (and no errors) into 
students, whereas the goal of a more dia-
lectical approach is the pursuit of truth 
and students learning how to think by 
identifying inconsistencies and contra-
dictions across different authors and 
ideas and then determining which are 
correct.19 The dialectical approach, ac-
cording to Adler, more readily prepares 
students for continued learning after (or 
between) periods of formal training and 
education by cultivating learning skills, 
an understanding of ideas, and the 
motivation to seek an even greater un-
derstanding of these same ideas. What 
is understood becomes “habit of the 
intellect” and is not readily forgotten, 
in contrast to items merely committed 
(and then soon lost) to memory.20
 Nurturing these skills is particularly 
relevant to reading and the self-study 
of history and war, which Col Wyly 
argues are requirements for develop-
ing military judgment. According to 
Wyly, leaders must “learn to analyze 
and make connections between battles 
of the past and battles of the future, 
and to conceptualize in order to deal 
with the unknown.”21 LtGen Paul K. 
Van Riper, the first president of Marine 
Corps University, similarly suggests,
[History] does though provide a rich 
context for understanding the terrible 
phenomenon that was, is, and will re-
main war. The vicarious experiences 
provided through study of the past en-
able practitioners to see familiar pat-
terns of activity and to develop more 
quickly potential solutions to tactical 
and operational problems.22
Thus, studying history must go beyond 
learning who won and who lost or iden-
tifying “lessons” or “recipes” for success 
for known problems. Active learning 
approaches are a critical element to ef-
fectuating lifelong learning and foster-
ing the ability to read critically, think 
reflectively, and understand the larger 
context in which decisions were made. 
These skills are critical to simulating 
the experiences of others and making 
our minds more agile and able to adapt 
to new or different situations.23
Active Learning Approaches
 The CPG directs us to change our 
current training and education para-
digm to become more “focused on 
active, student-centered learning.”26 
The current paradigm is based on what 
Herb Simon refers to as “the fallacy 
of rote memorization.” Simon notes, 
“Rote memorization, as we know all 
too well, produces the ability to repeat 
back memorized material but not the 
ability to use it in solving problems.”27 
Most decisions in battle are decisions 
of encounter that demand the ability to 
think quickly under the twin pressures 
of limited time and limited information 
as opposed to methodical set pieces that 
afford plenty of time to plan and the 
ability to make decisions at a time of the 
individual or organization’s choosing.28 
While some of these decisions can be 
fairly routine and executed by following 
standard operating procedures, novel 
and ill-structured problems demand 
more intuition and judgment as well 
as the intellectual agility to recognize 
conditions and situational cues that 
are analogous to previous experiences 
and link these insights to appropriate 
actions. Leaders must be able to quickly 
reflect on similarities and differences 
and then translate and adapt the anal-
ogy to the current situation.29 Thus, 
training and education must be focused 
on active practice in problem solving, 
increasing meaningful experiences, and 
making decisions rather than simply 
remembering.30
 Military organizations, however, are 
limited in their ability to create realistic 
training scenarios that replicate actual 
conditions in war,31 forcing them to 
grapple with the challenge of “learning 
from samples of one or fewer.”32 Indi-
vidual experience can be enhanced by 
active, scenario-based learning methods 
that put students in complicated, un-
foreseen scenarios demanding decisions 
on short timelines.33 Wyly cautions that 
if the teacher provides the student as 
much information as the student feels 
he needs, “then you have given him 
“What the student gains from the case study is not a 
formula for achieving success, but a look at human 
behavior in combat, an understanding of the many 
variables involved, an appreciation of which vari-
ables weigh more under different circumstances, and 
some additions to his ‘bag of tricks’ for application in 
real war.” 24
—Col Mike Wyly
“The focus of effort [of PME] should be teaching 
through doing, through case studies, historical and 
present-day, real and hypothetical, presented in war 
games, map exercises, sand table exercises, free-
play, force-on-force ‘three day wars’ and the like.” 25
—Gen Gray
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too much. Combat decision making 
is decision making with incomplete 
information.”34 These active learning 
methods include historical case stud-
ies, sand table or map exercises, tactical 
decision games, terrain walks, or tactical 
exercises without troops. Basing these 
scenarios on actual historical events 
keeps the exercises rooted in reality 
and enables the student to study hu-
man behavior, which Wyly notes is “the 
essence of the determinant in battle,” 
rather than simply theorizing.35
 Active learning is based on the idea 
that learning has to occur in—and 
transform—the minds of students.36 
Tools of passive learning techniques like 
checklist rubrics and prescription solu-
tions for exams and papers are impedi-
ments to this kind of transformation. 
Teachers should also be cautious about 
tailoring discussions and providing 
prompts, templates, or examples (e.g., of 
papers or projects) from previous classes 
that limit the creativity of students and 
“guide” them to a certain response or 
conceptualization. For example, Col 
Wyly recommends that instead of se-
lecting an historical example to teach 
a given concept of maneuver warfare, 
the teacher should instead assign a read-
ing and then ask the students what they 
discovered from the operation.37 Rapid, 
logical decision making should be the 
goal, not “right” answers or following 
prescribed procedures. 
 Refocusing towards more active, 
transformational learning as opposed 
to the industrial era’s emphasis on me-
thodical teaching requires a significant 
amount of change on our instructors’ 
and faculties’ part, too. However, de-
spite the enormous role instructors and 
faculty play in fostering an effective 
learning environment, they receive com-
parably little attention in discussions of 
training and education. It is seemingly 
assumed they are able (and willing) to 
adapt to any new teaching methodol-
ogy, which, at best, takes some time. 
For example, even though active learn-
ing has been recognized as a superior 
method of classroom instruction, most 
college science, technology, engineer-
ing, and mathematics instructors still 
rely on traditional teaching methods 
(i.e., passive lectures).38 Since teaching 
is a cooperative art, our instructors and 
faculty might also need to be retooled 
so they are capable of working with 
students and adapting to their capa-
bilities.39 Lastly, we must not lose sight 
that teachers, first and foremost, must 
be learners, and their instruction should 
require genuine intellectual activity on 
their part and not simply “professing” 
material that students memorize.40 
They (and our training and educa-
tion institutions) must be comfortable 
teaching without set lesson plans and 
be flexible enough to follow the twists 
and turns discussions might take.
A Few Additional Trends in Education 
Relevant to E4S and an Invitation to 
the Pain of Learning 
 In addition to incorporating active 
learning methods, there are additional 
insights from, and trends in, civilian 
education that might be relevant to 
transitioning to a post-industrial era 
training and education paradigm.42 
David Epstein identifies chunking, in-
terleaving, and testing as three impor-
tant considerations in developing broad 
problem-solving capabilities. Chunking 
refers to the ability of experts to group 
multiple data points into smaller, more 
meaningful “chunks” based on pattern 
recognition derived from experience.43 
Relying too heavily on experience, how-
ever, can lead to deleterious results if too 
much emphasis is placed on identifying 
the first familiar solution available. In 
fact, successful reinforcement and re-
inforced pretraining both undermine 
one’s ability to comprehend subsequent 
rule discovery, or why certain solutions 
are being rewarded.44
 For knowledge to be flexible across 
different (and in new) situations and 
domains, it must be learned under vary-
ing conditions and in periods of mixed 
rather than blocked instruction.45 Doug 
Rohrer and Kelli Taylor find that math 
students who practice problems blocked 
by type perform worse than those that 
practice a mixed sample of problems 
covering multiple previous lessons.46 
Research focused on naval air defense 
simulations similarly found that prac-
tice variability enhances the transfer-
ability of training.47 Lastly, excessive 
hint-giving (e.g., your proverbial “foot 
stompers”) may improve immediate 
performance, but it undermines long-
term progress. Training without hints 
is slower and more error-ridden, but it is 
more conducive to long-term learning, 
since attempts at information retrieval 
prime the brain for subsequent learn-
ing.48
 As we proceed in our quest to en-
hance the intellectual agility and pre-
paredness of our warfighters, we must 
be willing to adapt all our educational 
efforts and adopt more active learning 
approaches that nurture enthusiasm and 
an appetite for lifelong learning. We 
have discussed some of the fundamental 
changes we need to make concerning 
how we teach. Implementing them, 
however, will require equally funda-
mental changes in how we administer. 
Educational progress oftentimes is not 
quantitatively measurable, and our 
organizations’ traditional bureaucratic 
desire to control, measure, and levy 
additional requirements can tend to 
dampen enthusiasm. At a recent ap-
pearance at the Brookings Institute, 
Gen Berger advised, “If you are com-
fortable with the rate of change now, 
you are moving too slow.”49 Change of 
course is never easy, but it is high time 
we embrace it so that we have the lead-
ers we need to compete and sustain our 
competitive advantage.
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